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PLUM,MER V. SUPERIOR COURT
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Applying the foregoing rule to the case at bar we find that,
even if it' be assumed that the agreement was so incorporated
into the decree that an order for compliance therewith could
be implied, there ,is nothing in the agreement which necessarily shows an intent to make it a part of a future divorce
decree. Nothing is said therein regarding the approval of the
agreement by the court, nor that it should become a part of
a subsequent decree. The rcference therein to the payments
being for maintenance and support, and a release of all
other claims for support are wholly consistent with the
agreement being in view of separation with no divorce involved. The agreement is complete in itself. However, the
divorce decrees do not order or direct either party to do or
perform any act or carry out any provision or stipulation provided for in the agreement. The interlocutory decree simply
by way of recital states that a copy of the contract "annexed
hereto and made a part hereof . . . is hereby ratified, approved and confirmed." The final decree contains a similar
recital.
In the Lazar case, supra, certain provisions of the agreement were set forth in the decree in haec verba following the
words "It is ordered, adjudged and decreed" that the acts
provided for therein be performed. In other words, the court
expressly ordered that such provisions be performed. Such
is not the case here, and it cannot be said that it was the
, intention of either the parties or the court that the provisions
of the agreement be made a part of the decrees to the extent
they were reduced to a final mandatory judgment, ordering'
and commanding the performance of certain acts, a failure to
perform which would constitute a contempt of court.
The rights of the parties under a mandatory judgment
whereby they may be subjected to punishment as contemnors
for a violation of its provisions, should not rest upon implication or conjecture, but' the language declaring such rights
or imposing burdens should be clear, specific and unequivocal
so that the parties may not be misled thereby.
.
Situations may arise where a trial court may be disposed
to approve a property settlement agreement in a divorce
action, and for the purpose of identifying such agreement,
cause the same to be annexed to the interlocutory decree of
. divorce, but for obvious reasons would refrain from making a
mandatory order that the parties be required to perform each
and every' provision of such agreement or be subjected to a
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charge of contempt of court for failure to do so. It is a matter
of common knowledge that such agreements often contain provisions which cannot be specifically enforced, and it would be
idle for a court to make a mandatory order directing the performance of such provisions. In those cases where it is the
intention of the parties and the court to have certain provisions of such an agreement constitute a part of the decree or
judgment and made enforceable as such, the court may set
forth such provisions in the decree and provide therein that
the same be performed. This is the usual practice and when
it is followed all doubt as to the effect of such provisions is
removed.
No such ,intention appears from the decrees in the case at
bar, and we therefore hold that the provisions of the agree.
ment cannot be enforced by a contempt proceeding.
The peremptory writ of mandate prayed for is denied.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Houser, J., and Tray.
nor, J., concurred.
"

Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied April 30,
1942. Edmonds, J., voted for a rehearing.

rCrim. No. 4382.
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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JOHN GONZALES
et aI.,
Appellants.
[1] Criminal Law-Evidence-Unlawful Seizure.-The fact that
evidence was obtained by an illegal search and seizure docs
not Ilffect its admissibility.
[28, 2b] ld. - Evidence - Unlawful Seizure _ Fairness of Trial,
Effect on.-While an unreasonable search and seizure may
constitute a violation of due process of law, the use of evi[1] Evidence obtained byillllgal search and seizure, note, 88
A. L. R. 3-18. See, also, 8 Cal. Jur. 78; 20 Am. Jur. 352.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Criminal Law, § 4l0; [3] Consti.
tutiollal Law, § 109; [4J Criminal La,v, §§ 408, 1382; Injunctions,
§ 17; [5] Witnosses, § 141; [6] Conspiracy, § 25; [7J COllspiracy,
§ 23; [8J Criminal Law, § 1404 (1).
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dcnce so obtained docs not constitute a denial of due proce:>s
of hl,Y'.• since that does not affect the fairness or impartiality
of the trial.
[.3] Ooustitutional Law - Due Process - Criminal Trial, Application to.-A. criminnl trial docs not constitute a denial of due
process of law so long as it is fair and impartial.
w Criuinal Law-Evidence-Injunction Agaiust Testifying: Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Evidence:, Injunctions
.-Matters Controllable-Testimony.-Thc issuance of an injUllction .restraining a person from testifying as to a matter
is .improper. And it is not error for a court at a criminal
trial to permit testimony in violation of such an injunction.
In any event, any· error in so doing is not prejudicial where
the testimony cannot be excluded on a new trial in view of
the' holding of the appellate court that it is admissible, and
of the affirmance of the order denying the injunction.
[5] Witnosses-1.·dross~examination - Subject Matter-Injunction
Against Testifying.-On cross-examination of a witn(;ss for
-the' prosecution, it is proper to sustain objection to a question
as·to whether the witness had not been enjoined from testifying, since the question is immaterial.
[6]Oonspiracy - Criminal-Instructions.-In a prosecution for"
conspiracy, it was not error to refuse a request for a charge
that in determining the existence of a conspiracy as to each
defendant testimony as to acts and declarations of the other
might not be considered, and a further request that the jury
might not consider acts of an alleged conspirator unless first
convinced from independent evidence that a conspiracy existed, where the court gave an instruction to the effect that
in considering the guilt of each defendant the jury should
consider only evidence admitted against him. Any ambiguity
in the instruction given by reason of its failure to indicate
the evidence admitted against each defendant was not prejudicial Where, at the time ev'idence as to acts and declarations
of each defendant was introduced, the court in the presence
of the jury stated whom it was admitted against.
[7] Id.-"-Criminal-Evidence-Sufficicncy.-Participation in a conspiracy cun be shown by circumstantial evidence. And the evidence is sufficicnt to support a conclusion as to a defendant's
participation iL a conspiracy to steal by use of a pretended
money mnking machine where it shows the presence of a bag
. containing the machine and' ~ttles of liquid in his apartment,
his possession of the key to the bag, his acquaintanceship
and association with the other alleged conspirator, and his
[7] See 5 Cal. Jur. 521, 11 Am. JUl'. 570.
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exhibition of a large roll of bills to the intended victim, and his
possession thereof when arrested.
[8] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Argument of Counsel-Reference to Extraneous Matters.-In a
prosecution for a conspiracy to steal, any misconduct of the
prosecutor during argument in referring to other bunco cases
was not sufficiently prejudicial to justify a reversal, particularly in view. of the trial court's refusal to grant a new
trial on such ground.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
mty and County of San Francisco and from orders denying
a new trial. Alfred J. Fritz, JUdge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for conspiracy to commit· grand theft. J udg.
ment of conviction and orders denying new trial affirmed.
Leo R. Friedman for Appellants.
Earl Warren, Attorney General, J. Albert Hutchinson and
David K. Lener, Deputies Attorney General, Matthew Brady,
District Attorney, and Joseph A. Garry, Assistant District
Attorney, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-On June 17, 1940, an indictment was filed
charging defendants Gonzales and Chierotti with having conspired together on May 25, 1940, to commit grand theft by
fraudulent representations to Secundo Valenzano regarding
a machine that purportedly could reproduce United States
currency with the use of certain chemicals. The evidence
showed that defendant Gonzales, after striking up an acquaintance with Secundo Valenzano, told Valenzano that a rich
man had the machine, that real currency was necessary in
making the reproductions, and that he would surreptitiously
get possession of the machine and bring it to Valenzano's
saloon. He brought the machine there, put some real bills
into it, used the chemicals, and when the machine was opened,
there were two bills for each one originally inserted. Thereupon Gonzales told Valenzano that if he could get several
thousand dollars in new bills, equal to an amount to be fur,
nished by Gonzales, each could double his money by using
the machine. Valenzano Pllt up no money but notified the
police who arrested both Gonzales and Chierotti.
Valenzano was the only witness who testified to the fore-
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going events. Police Officer Iredale testified that on June 6,
1940, he and Police Officer Linss, without any warrant, authority, or permission, entered the apartment of dcfendant
Chierotti in the latter's absence and took therefrom a black
case containing not only bottles of liquid but a machine,
subsequently identified by Valenzano as that used by Gonzales.Chierotti and Gonzales objected to any testimony by
Officer Iredale regarding the entry and search of Chierotti's
apartment and the seizure of the case and eontents, as well
as to the introduction and use of the latter as evidence, on
the ground that the entry, search, seizure, and use of the
property violated the rights guaranteed to Chierotti by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, and the search and seizure and due process clauses
of the Constitution of California. (Cal. Const., art. I, secs.
19, 13.)
Before the commencement of the trial Chierotti sought an
injunction ill an independent proceeding against the San
Francisco Police Department and Officer Iredale to enjoin
the use of. the case and contents at the trial and to restrain
Officer Iredale from testifying to anything he saw, did or
heard while engaged in his search and seizure. The court denied the injunction and Chierotti appealed to .this court.
Pending determination of the appeal, the lower court granted
a temporary injunction restraining Officer Iredale. from testifying with regard to the entry into Chierotti's apartment.
Many months before the trial Chierotti filed a written; motion
for an order directing the returp to him of the case and contents, and the exclusion from evidence, not only of this property, but of any testimony of the officers regarding the search
and 'seizureor based on information acquired as a result:
thereof. The motion was denied. At the trial the court re"
fuSed to.enforce the temporary injunction, allowing Officer
Iredale to testify in direct defiance thereof. The defendants
were found guilty.by the jury. After judgment was prollOUllced e/!-ch defendant ~ppealed to this court from the order,
depying 9.is motion for a new trial and from the judgment.
. [1] The Fourth Amendment to the Co:qstit'qtioD. of the
United. States prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures
by fede~al; qfficers .. '. Pursuant to this mandate the federal
cOJll'ts forbid the introduction in court of evidence. obtained
by an illegal search or seizure if a timely motion for its
exclusion is made by the accused. (Byar~ v. United States,
g73 U,,:S. 28 [47 S. Ct. 248, 71 L. Ed. 520] ; Go-Bart Im-

~,
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porting 00. v. United States, 283 U. S. 344 [51 S. Ct. 153,
75 L. Ed. 374] ; Gouled v. United States, 252 U. S. 298, 302
[41 S. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647] ; Silverthorne Lumber 00. v.
United States, 251 U. S. 385 [40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 319] ;
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 [6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L.
Ed. 746] ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 [34 S. Ct.
341, 58 L. Ed. 652] ; Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338
[60 S. Ct. 266, 84 L. Ed. 307] ; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S.
727, 733 [24 L. Ed. 877] ; Amos v. United States, 252 U.S.
313[41 S. Ct. 266, 65 L. Ed. 654] ; Agnello v. United States,
269 U. S. 20 [46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145].) The California
Constitution contains an identical provision (Cal. Const., art.
I, sec. 19),but the accepted rule in this state, as in many
others, permits the introduction of improperly obtained evidence on the ground that the illegality of the search and
seizure does not affect the admissibility of the evidence. (Peoplev. Mayen; 188 Cal. 237 [205 Pac. 435, 24 A. L. R. 1383] ;
In re Polizzotto, 188 Cal. 410 [205 Pac. 676]; People v. Le
Doux. 155 Cal. 535 [102 Pac. 517] ; Herrscher v. State Bar,
4 Cal.. (2d) 399 [49 P. (2d) 832]. See cases cited in 88
A. L. R, 348.) The defendant may have civil and criminal rel;lledies against the officers for their illegal acts (see
Pen. Code, sec. 146; Silva v. MacAuley, 135 Cal. App. 249
[26 P. (2d) 887, 27 P. (2d) 791]; Ryan v. Orist, 23 Cal.
App.744 [139 Pac. 436] ; 15 So. Cal. L. Rev. 139, 141 et seq.),
but the state is not precluded from using the evidence obtained thereby.
[2a] The Fourth Amendment- to the Constitution of the
United States is not a limitation upon the states' (National
Safety Deposit 00. v. Stead, 232 U. S. 58 [34 S. Ct. 209, 58
L. Ed. 504] ; Ohio v. Dollison, 194 U. S. 445 [24 S. Ct. 703,
48 L. Ed. 1Q62]), and California is free to interpret its o:.vn
Constitution. Defendants contend, however, that the prohibition in the Fourth Amendment of unreasonable searches' and
seizures is included in the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law,and therefore that under
the interpretation given to the Fourth Amendment. by the
federal courts the introduction of evidence obtained by' an
illegal search and seizure constitutes a denial of due process
of law. Not all of the first I ten amendments to the federal
Constitution~ however, fall within the concept of due process
law. (Palko v. Oonnecticut, 302 U. S: 319 [58 S. Ct.~49,
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82, L. Ed.28~] ; Twini.ng v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 [29 S.
bt. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97] ; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97
[:>48. Ct.S30, 78 L. Ed. 674, 90 A. L. R. 575]. See 3V Han
L.,~ey., 431; 24 Harv. L. Rev. 366.) In the determination of
wli~ther the .. prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures is included within this concept, the unlawful search
~nd' seizure must be distinguished from the introduction in
cQurt oLtheevidence obtained as a result thereof. "The right
of th~ people, to be ,secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
eff.~'Ctsag~inst unreasonable searches and seizures" may be
SR ,£1t~d!lD;lclltal as to make any unreasonable search ano. seiz~fby: ,a ~'I;!ublic O+pcer a violation of due process ?f law. It
<loesnot necessarily follow, however, that the use III a court
oOaw of eyidencethus obtained is so contrary to fundamental
principles of liberty and justice as to constitute a' denial of
due', proce,ss
~a.w.[3] A criminal trial does not consti-,
tute~ ;a,dellial Qfdue,process of law so long as it is fair and
~pai-t,iar:, (Seec~ses Cited in 16 C. J. S., p. 1185 et seq..) There
is 'a'fBilu:r;e to observe "that fundamental fairness essential
t,6' the'y~rJ:"concept of justice" when a trial is but a pretense
(Lisenba v. Calif()rnia, 314 U. S. 219, 236 [62 S. Ct. 280"
290,861.. Ed. -'-'])1 asa tdal dominated by a mob (Moore
v. DcrtJ-pscy, 261 U. S. 86 [·.13 S. Ct. 265, 67 L. Ed. 5·13]), or
whwthe dofcndnnt is denied the right to counsel (Johnson
v. Zerbst,;S04 U. S. 458 [58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461)),
or when his conviction results from testimony Imov,n by the
prosecution to be perjured (Mooney v. Holohan, 29·,:, U. S.
103 [55S.Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791, 98 A. L. R. 406 J) or from
an involuntary confession obtained through coercion or .torture. (Chambers Y. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 [60 S. Ct. 472, 84
L. Ed. 716] ; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 [56 S. Ct.
461, 80 L. Ed. 682].) [2b] While the United States Supreme
Court has held that the due process clause includes the gU[lrantee of the Fifth Amendment against compul.;;ory self-incrimination to the extent that the Amendment forbids the use
of a confession obtained by coercion or tortur6 (Chambers v.
Florida, supra; Brown v. Mississippi, supraj Lis£nba v. California, supra. See Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 [liS
S. Ct. 183, 42 L. Ed. 568]), it has done so because 11. confession obtained by coercion or torture is so unreliable thllt its
use violates all concepts of fairness and justice. (Chambers
v. Florida, supraj Brown v. Mississippi, supraj Lisenba v.
California, supra; cf. T'wining v. New Jersey, supra.) The usc
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of evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure, however, does not violate due process of law for it does not affect the
fairness or impartiality of the trial. (People v. Defore, 242
N. Y. 13 [150 N. E. 585] ; People v. Mayen, supraj Com. v.
Donnelly, 246 Mass. 507 [141 N. E. 500] ; Johnson v. State,
152 Ga. 271 [109 S. E. 662,19 A. L. R. 641].) The fact that
an officer acted improperly in obtaining evidence presented
at the trial in no way precludes the court from rendC'rin~ a
fair and impartial judgment. It has long been an estublishrd
rule of evidence that "the admissibility of evidence is not
affected by the illegality of the means through which the
party has been enabled to obtain the evidence." (8 Wigmore,
Evidence, (3rd. ed.) sec. 2183, p. 5, and cases there cited.) .
[4] Defendants contend that the trial court should not'
have permitted Officer Iredale to testify in vie'w of the temporary injunction restraining him from testifying with regard
to the entry into Chierotti's apartment. Objections to the
testimony of a witness, however, should be made to the court
before which he testifies and have no place in an injunction
proceeding in another court. Any competent person who is
properly subpoened, and who is not privileged, must appear
in court and answer questions pertinent to the matter in issue.
If he refuses to testify he may be punished for contempt of
court, and no one may lawfUlly prevent or dissuade him from
testifying. (Code Civ. Proc. secs. 128, 177, 1955, 1986, 1990,
1991, 1992, 1993; Pen. Code secs. 136, 166, 1331. See cases
cited in 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed.) sees. 2190-21!j5; 27
Cal. Jur., p. 9 et seq.) Cleariy it is the objective of these provisions to prevent interference with the testimony of witnesses and the issuance of the temporary injunction was therefore improper. Even if it were error for the trial court to
permit Officer Iredale to testify despite the temporary injunction it was in no way prejudicial to defendants, for such testimony could not be excluded on a new trial in view of the
holding herein that the testimony was admissible and the
affirmance of the order denying an injunction in Chierotti v.
San FrMteisco Police Department, S. F. 16646, this day decided, post p. 895 [124 P. (2d) 51].
[5] On cross-examination defendants' attorney asked Officer Iredale if he had not been enjoined from testifying concerning anything he had lflarned as a re.<3ult of his illegal
search of Chierotti's apartment. Defendants contend that
they had a right to ask this question for the purpose of iIU-

172

PEOPLE V. GONZALES

[20 C. (2d)

Apr. 19·12]

PEOPLE V. GONIIALES

173

[20 C. (2d) 165]

peaching the credibility oj' the witness by showing interest,
bias, or prejudice and that the trial court therefore erred in
sustaining an objection to it. It does not follow, however, that
a witness would be inclined to testify falsely because he testified in the face of an injunction. On the contrary, in the
words of the trial court, "the jury would be more inclined to
believe the police officer who testified, if he testified despite
the injunction and order. They would believe he was doing
his duty." The question was immaterial and the objection
to it was properly sustained.
[6] Defendants have also objected to the refusal of the
trial court to give certain instructions to the jury. Proposed
instruction number 30 stated: " ... It is the law of thiS state,
that in determining whether any such conspiracy existed of
which the defendant Chierotti was a party, that testimony of
the acts or declarations or the defendant Gonzales cannot be
considered by you, and it is your duty to disregard all evidence as to any acts or declarations of the defendant Gonzales,
and to determine the existence or non-existence of such conspiracy, so far as defendant Chierotti is concerned, from such
other evidence as may be in the case against him. The fact
that an unlawful conspiracy existed of which the defendant
Chierotti was a member and the unlawful purpose of such
conspiracy, must be established by evidence, to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt, separate and apart
from and independent of any testimony as to any declarations
that were made by the defendant Gonzales. In other words,
in determining whether defendant Chierotti was a member
of the conspiracy charged you cannot consider any declaration or act that the defendant Gonzales said or did." Proposed instruction number 31 is the same as number 30 except
that it applies to defendant Gonzales instead of defendant
Chierotti. Proposed instruction number 32 stated: "You are
instructed that a conspiracy cannot be proven merely by the
acts or declarations of an alleged conspirator and that you
may not consider such acts or declarations unless you are first
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by entirely independent
evidence that a conspiracy existed."
The trial court instructed the jury on the subject of these
instructions as follows: "The first fundamental question that
you should determine in this case is: Was there in fact a
conspiracy formed as charged in the indictment? If you
answer that question in the negative, you are at an end of
the case and your verdict should be not guilty, If, on the

.'

other hand, you answer that question in the affirmative, you
should then determine the question whether these defendants
actively participated and entered into such conspiracy or
scheme. In deciding the issues in this case you should take
into consideration all the evidence admitted in the case, both
for the State and for the defendants.... In considering the
guilt or innocence of the defendant Chierotti you must consider only the evidence that has been admitted against him
and cannot consider any evidence that has been admitted
only as evidence against the defendant Gonzales. In considering the guilt or innocence of the defendant Gonzales you
must consider only the evidence that has been admitted
against him and cannot consider any evidence that has been
admitted only as against the defendant Chierotti. You cannot return a verdict finding one of the defendants guilty
solely on the ground that you find the evidence sufficient to
est:tblish the guilt of the other defendant."
These instructions told the jury that evidence admitted
against Chierotti could not be used against Gonzales and that
evidence admitted against Gonzales could not be used against
Chierotti. They are ambiguous in failing to indicate to the
jury what evidence was admitted against Gonzales and what
evidence was admitted against Chierotti. The record, however, reveals that at the time evidence as to the acts and
declarations of Gonzales was introduced, the court stated in
the presence of the jury that the evidence was admitted
against Gonzales and not against Chierotti, and that at the
time evidence as to the acts and declarations of Chierotti was
introduced the court stated that it was admitted against
Chierotti and not against Gonzales. The instructions, therefore, read in conjun~tion with the statements of the court
during the trial indicated to the jury that the acts and
declarations of Gonzales could not be used to prove Chierotti
a party to the conspiracy and that the acts and declarations
of Chierotti could not be used to prove Gonzales a party
thereto. Any error in the instructions because of their
ambiguity was therefore not prejudicial to defendants.
[7] Defendants contend the evidence is insufficient to
establish that Chierotti participated in the conspiracy. Participation in a conspiraey, however, can be shown by circumstantial evidence. (See cases cited in 5 Cal. JUl'. 521.) The
evidence shows that a bag containing the money making machine and bottles of liquid was in Chierotti's apartment, that
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Chierotti had possession of the key to the lock on the bag,
thatChierotti knew Gonzales, that Gonzales had been to
Chierotti's apartment and was there on the Monday before
the arr~ta were made, that Chierotti was seen leaving his
apartment house with Gonzales carrying a bag, that Gonzales
met with Chierotti shortly after leaving Valenzano's tavern,
that Gonzales exhibited to Valenzano a large roll of bills but
when Gonzales and Chierotti were arrested together shortly
thereafter Chierotti· had possession of a large roll of bills
but Gonzales. did not. This evidence is sufficient to justify the
jury's conclusion that Chierotti participated with Gonzales in
a .conspiracy to steal money from Valenzano by use of the
pretended money making machine.
[8] Any misconduct that may have existed on the prosecutor'sp'art in referring to other bunco cases and bunco
game~ during the course of his argument to the jury is not
sufficiently prejudicial to justify reversal, particularly since
the trial court refused to grant a new trial on this ground.
(See Imlay v. Oalifornia Oab 00., 124 Cal. App. 68 [11 P.
(2d) 1116] ; Alberts v. Lytle, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 682 [37 P.
(2d) 705].)
.
The judgment of conviction and orders denying a new trial
are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
CARTER, J., Dissenting.-I dissent.
The rule followed by the majority opInlOn seriously impairs the efficacy and sanctity of the constitutional guarantce
against unlawfUl searches and seizures. (Cal. Const., art. I,
sec. 19.) The particular issue is the competency of evidence
in a criminal proceeding which bas been obtained from defendant in violation of that constitutional prohibition. Although it is my opinion that the same constitutional guarantee
appearing· in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States is applicable to states as well as federal
agencies because it is one of the fundamental liberties embraced in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, I will limit my discussion to theproposition that even if the right to be secure against unlawful
searches and seizures is not protected by the federal Constitution with reference to state agencies, the provision in our
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state Constitution compels the rule that evidence obtained in
contravention tbereof shall not be competent or admissible.
It cannot be seriously questioned that to permit tbe use of
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional provision
at least to some extent infringes upon the field of liberty secured by the inhibition against unlawfUl searches and seizures.
But it goes beyond a mere partial invasion. It in effect practically-destroys the right. That is true for the reason that the
value of any right varies in direct proportion to the means
afforded for the protection of the right; the realization of any
benefit from the right is wholly dependent upon the existence
of instruments for that purpose. If it may be violated and
the fruits of the violation directed against the possessor of it,
the fruita of it are lost, and it is no more than a bare abstraction.
I take it that a person in preserving the right here involved is justified in committing homicide. However, if he
does not adopt that extreme mcasure, and in a well ordered
social system that should be discouraged, he is faced with
possibility that evidence obtained may be used against him.
Certainly he shoUld be given credit and security rather than
being penalized for failing to pursue such an extreme course.
Permitting such evidence to be used is an invitation and
encouragement to law cnforcing officials to violate the Constitution. It gives them free reign to act upon mere suspicion
and conjecture, to the harassment of the persons offended
and to the end that the sanctity of his home or depository of
his papers and effects is destroyed. It is of small comfort to
. say that he has an action against the officers. In most instances the amount of recovery would be negligible and the
process costly.
In Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 [34 S. Ct. 341, 58
L. Ed. 652], it was stated with respect to this issue:
"Judge Cooley, in his Constitutional Limitations, pp. 425,
426, in treating of this feature of our Constitution said: 'The
maxim that "every man's house js his castle" is made a part
of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and has always been looked upon
as of high value to the citizen.' 'Accordingly,' says Lieber
in his work on Civil Liberty and Self-Government, 62, in
speaking of the English la", in this respect, 'no man's house
can be forcibly opened, or he or his goods be carried away
after it has thus beeu forced, except in cases of felony; and
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then the sheriff must be furnished with a warrant, and take
great, care lest he commit a trespass. This principle is jeaI:ously insisted upon.' In Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 733,
[24 L. Ed.' 877,879], this court recognized the principle of
protection as applicable to letters and sealed packages in the
mail, and held that, consistently .with this guarantee of the
right of 'the peqple to be secure in their pa.pers against unreasonable searches and seizures, such matter could only be
opened ~nd, examined upon warrants issued on oath or affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be seized, 'as is
required when papers are subjected to search .in one's own
household. '
"In the Boyd case, supra, after citing Lord Camden's
judgment in E·ntick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, Mr.
Justice Bradley said (630):
" 'The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very
essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach
farther than the concrete form of the case then before the
court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to. all
invasions on the part of the government and its employees
of the sanctity: of a man's home and the privacies of life. It
is not the breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his ~,
drawers that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is
the invasion 6f his indefeasible right of personal security, personalliberty, and private property, where that right has never
been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense,-it
is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment.' " And
again:
"The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the
guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to
be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established
byye8.1"8 of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in
their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land."
.In addition to the federal courts, the following states have
adopted the rule that evidence obtained in violation of the
Constitution is not admissible. (Florida, Idaho, lllinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Oklab,oma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming.) (See 24 A. L. R.
1408 ; ~2 id. 40&; 41 id. 1145; 52 id. 477; 88 id. 348; 134 id.
819.)
.
'Obviously, the purpose and object of the constitutional proTIsionin question was to guarantee security to
individual
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against invasion of his premises by officers seeking evidence
which might be used by them in a criminal prosecution without making oath or affirmation particularly describing the
place to be searched or the person or thing to be seized. In
other words, it was contemplated by the framers of the Constitution that before an officer should be permitted to secure
evidence by means of a search and seizure, the facts supporting the claim of right to make the search should be submitted
to a magistratc in the form of an affidavit, and if the magistrate determined such facts to be sufficient he would issue a
warrant authorizing the search of premises particularly described in the warrant and the seizure of the person or thing
particularly described therein. To say that to permit the use
of evidence acquired in violation of this constitutional provision docs not abrogate or destroy the constitutional right so
guaranteed is to my' mind counterfeit logic.
History reveals many abuses by public officers both in England and colonial times in this country when officers invaded
the premises of persons suspected of crimes, many of which
have long since been abolished, and the papers and effects
of innocent victims seized and used for the persecution as well
HS prosecution of such victims. It was to prevent these abuses
that the Fourth Amendment was added to the Constitution
of the United States and section 19 of article I was incorporated in the Constitution of California. In my opinion there
is no such urgency or necessity enjoined upon prosecuting
officers today to obtain evidence of law violation which requires them to violate a constitutional provision so specific
in its prohibitions, and which has enshrined within its provisions such sacred concepts of liberty, security and justice as
the constitutional provision here in question.
The more I read and hear about the tyranny of totalitarianism as it pervades a large part of the world today, the more
appreciative I am of the constitutional form of government
and the constitutional guarantees which we have in this country and in this state. And every time I see an effort being
made to abrogate or nullify by interpretation any of the constitutional provisions designed to protect the life, liberty and
property of the people, I shudder to contemplate what will
happen if this disposition to abrogate and nullify these constitutional provisions continues. I, for one, shall never yield
to the doctrine that a con!3titutional provision designed to
protect the life, liberty and property of the people of this
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country should. be abrogated or nullified by interpretation.
If political, social or economic conditions require changes in
,our Constitution, such changes should be made by amending
the Constitution in the manner prescribed by it, but it is not
for the courts by their decisions to abrogate or nullify constitutional provisions by interpretation or read into those provisions that which was never intended to be included therein.
In .my opinion it was prejudicial error requiring a reversal
of the judgment for the trial court to admit the evidence
obtained by the police officers as the result of the unlawful
entry and search of the premises occupied by the defendants,
and tHe judgment of conviction against them should therefore
be reversed.

where the applicable code section provides that he holds his
office at the pleasure of the appointing power.

APPEAL from a jUdgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Ruben S. Schmidt, JUdge. Affirmed.
Action for a declaration as to whether a secretary of the
Department of Institutions was entitled to certain fees as
guardian and for a judgment therefor, and also for restoration to his position following his discharge therefrom. Judgment for defendants on the pleadings affirmed.
Lucien A. Sauvage and A. Brigham Rose for Appellant.

Houser, J., concurred.
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Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 30,
1942. Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.
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FRANK SCULLY, Appellant, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA
et aI., Respondents.
[1] Hospitals - Inmates - Estates - Fees of Guardian. - Under
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6660, as it stood prior to 1941, the secretary of the Department of Institutions was not entitled to a
judgment against the State for the amount of fees fixed by the
probate court for services rendered as guardian.
[2] Public Officers-Removal-Will of Appointing Power.-Inasmuch as the term of the secretary of the Department of Institutions is' not fixed by law, the appointee holds office at the
pleasure of the appointing power. (See Pol. Code, § 878.)

[3] Pleading-Conclusions-Right.-An allegation that the discharge of an employee "was without right or foundation in law
and justification in fact" must be regarded as a conclusion
[2] See 21 Cal. Jur. 980; 22 R. C. L. 562.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Hospitals and Asylums, §14; [2]
Public Officers, § 132; [3] Pleading, § 21.
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OURTIS, J.-[l] Plaintiff, as secretary of the Department of Institutions of the State of California, was appointed
guardian of a number of estates of incompetent persons, and
thereafter the probate court fixed the fees to which the guardian was entitled in the several estates, which collectively
amounted to the sum of $2,650. Plaintiff instituted this
action to have it declared that he was entitled to said fees
and for judgment in the amount of such fees. The first and
second causes of action of the amended complaint set forth
the above facts. The defendants moved for judgment on the
pleadings and the court granted the motion. Plaintiff has
appealed from said judgment.
The judgment should be sustained, as section 6660 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code in force prior to its amendment in 1941, under which plaintiff was appointed and acted
as such guardian of the estates of said incompetent persons,
provided that "The secretary of the Department of Institutions shall serve as such guardian . . . and shall receive
such reasonable fees for his services as such guardian . . .
as the court allows. Such fees shall be paid into the State
treasury to become a part of and to be added to the approp.riation or special fund in the State treasury, made available
by law for the support or management of the department."
[2] In a third cause of action plaintiff sought to be restored to his position as sJcretary of the Department of Institutions from which he was discharged by the director of said

